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Abstract
The paper analyzes the relationship between income shares, wealth and growth in an environment where positional goods are
taken into account and rent is generated. This hypothesis, which is a macro engine for inequality, creates a gap between profit share
and property share and implies a clear-cut distinction between capital and wealth.
The interactions between these aspects are studied in a medium-run growth model led by aggregate demand, where monetary
aspects also matter. The results of the dynamic analysis, obtained by means of simulations, are in keeping with some recent stylized
facts. Furthermore, the model generates bounded dynamics, where the co-movements between variables are more complex than those
obtained in the recent literature. At the same time the disequilibrium processes can create a link between medium-run considerations
and a more long-run perspective.
© 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of National Association of Postgraduate Cen-
ters in Economics, ANPEC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Resumo
Esse artigo analisa a relac¸ão entre participac¸ão na renda, riqueza e crescimento em um ambiente em que bens de ‘status’ são
levados em considerac¸ão e renda é gerada. Essa hipótese, que é uma macro motor de desigualdade, cria um hiato entre participac¸ão
dos lucro e participac¸ão de propriedades e implica em uma distinc¸ão clara entre capital e riqueza. As interac¸ões entre esses aspectos
são estudados em um modelo de crescimento de médio prazo impulsionado pela demanda agregada, onde aspectos monetários
são importantes também. Os resultados dessa análise dinâmica, obtidos por meio de simulac¸ões, estão de acordo com alguns fatos
estilizados. Além disso, o modelo gera uma dinâmica restrita, onde o co-movimento entre as variáveis são mais complexos do que
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queles encontrados na literatura recente. Ao mesmo tempo, o processo de desequilíbrio pode criar uma ligac¸ão entre considerac¸ões
e médio-prazo e uma perspectiva de mais longo prazo.
 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of National Association of Postgraduate Cen-
ers in Economics, ANPEC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
alavras chave: Participac¸ão de propriedade e do lucro; Bens de status; Riqueza privada; Desigualdade; Ciclos limites
.  Introduction
If one considers the performance of advanced economies in recent times, there are three stylized facts worth
entioning: (i) a falling labour share; (ii) an increasing wealth output ratio and (iii) stagnating growth that produces
egative repercussions on the labour market.
These patterns are in strong contrast with the Kaldorian “stylized facts” that any growth theory was supposed to
imic. While the first one violates the hypothesis of constant share, which, given a constant capital/output ratio, implies
lso a stationary rate of profit, the second one was not even mentioned as a macro theme.
In fact, wealth has mainly been a subject of microeconomics, welfare theory or fiscal policy, where the personal
istribution of income matters. One of Piketty’s (2014) main contributions has been to cast the two themes, i.e. income
hare and wealth distribution, into a macro dimension, where inequality provides the profound links between the two
spects. These relationships are studied in a very long time horizon and within a steady state environment.
With respect to this analysis, the paper introduces three substantial changes. First, positional goods and rents are
ntroduced into the analysis. Even though from an empirical point of view they are not the major vehicle of capital gains,
hey seem to represent the “zeitgeist” of the present economic situation, dominated by bubbles and their aftermath.
urthermore, from an analytical point if view, they oblige to draw a clear-cut distinction between capital and wealth and
o deal with profits and rents, as far as income shares are concerned. Second, the time horizon of the present paper is
horter because it refers to a medium-run perspective (see also Ferri, 2011) which is better suited to capture the events of
he “Great Recession” (see also Cynamon et al., 2013). Third, the model put forward is characterized by the following
eatures: its dynamics are driven by aggregate demand, where investment plays a fundamental role. Furthermore, the
odel operates in a monetary economy, as defined by Keynes. Finally, steady state considerations are supplemented
y a dynamic process of interdependence, where the feedbacks between variables make the co-movements between
hem more complex. In this context, one must possibly consider how instability can affect inequality and how the latter
an feedback on the former.
The results of the dynamic analysis are obtained by means of simulations. They not only can mimic the stylized facts
efore mentioned, but they generate bounded dynamics where accelerating expansions are endogenously followed by
pposite movements. At the same time they indicate that the relationship between income share, wealth and growth can
ssume different features depending on the nature of the model, the type of hypotheses put forward and the quantitative
alue of the parameters.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the recent literature. Section 3 introduces rents and
ositional goods, and identifies the proper income share. Section 4 deals with capital and wealth ratios and defines
echnology. Section 5 presents a demand-led growth model, discusses steady state relationships and uses simulations
n order to carry out a disequilibrium analysis. Section 6 discusses the robustness of a linearized version of the model,
t also considers an extension of the model and discusses the implications of different growth scenarios. Section 7
oncludes. Appendices A and B includes mathematical details.
.  A  review  of  the  recent  literature
The main contribution of Piketty’s (2014) analysis is to have studied the macro conditions that favour inequality
see Milanovic, 2014 and the Special issue of Real-World Economics Review, 2014 for a review of the book).These macro conditions are determined by two laws: the “first fundamental law” is initially derived from an identity,
.e. the definition of profit share (α):
α  ≡  rβ  (2.1)
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If r, the average return of capital, is assumed to be given and stationary, then the identity becomes an equation and
turns itself in the “first fundamental law”, which states that an increase in β, which is both the wealth/output ratio and
the capital/output ratio, is accompanied by a surge in the profit share α. Since capital is more unequally distributed
than labour, it follows that profit share can be used as a macro proxy of inequality, which ultimately depends on wealth
distribution.
The second fundamental law of capitalism is given by:
g  = s
β
(2.2)
where s  is the (net) exogenous propensity to save and g  the rate of growth. This formula is in keeping with the long-run
steady state relationship à la Harrod-Domar (see also Fazzari et al., 2013; Dutt, 2006). Suppose that g is determined à
la Solow, i.e. by the supply side of the economy and therefore is equal to the rate of growth of productivity and labour
force. It then follows that, for a given s, a fall of g  implies an increase in β. Stagnation induces an increase in wealth.
Since a stagnation period is in front of us, a higher wealth/ratio and therefore increasing inequalities are expected. The
forecast is based upon the following causal scheme:
g  ↓→  β  ↑  α  ↑
In other words, an exogenous fall in the rate of growth (g) entails an increase in the wealth/output ratio β  and an
increase in the profit share (α). Since capital is more unequally distributed than labour, the rise in α  is accompanied by
an increase in inequality. This result is at the root of the macro inference of inequality pursued by Piketty (2014).
The results do not depend only on the neoclassical nature of the model, but they are marked by two aspects that are
worth stressing. The first one is that there is no distinction between capital and wealth. It follows that the capital/output
ratio v  of the growth literature has been replaced by β, the wealth/output ratio in the two formulas above. This fallacy
has been stressed by many authors (see also Aspromourgos, 2015; Homburg, 2014). A consequence of the distinction is
that a rise of β  does not necessarily entails a rise in v and therefore other causes, apart from technology, are to be looked
for, as suggested by Stiglitz (2015). The second aspect is that these relationships are characterized by complex dynamic
patterns so that it is essential to overcome exercises of comparative statics in order to find meaningful relationships
and feedbacks in a dynamic context.
3.  Rents  and  positional  goods
3.1.  An  introduction
Although one is the complement of the other, capital share and labour share do not usually raise the same type of
problems. This is the reason why they have been studied with different approaches in time and in different contexts.
Usually, in empirical studies, the emphasis is on the labour share defined as:
1 −  α  = WN
PY
i.e. the ratio of real wages to output per man, usually measured in terms of value added. This strategy is one way of
bypassing the so-called “capital debate” (see Harcourt, 1972). Most of the studies agree on the global decline of the
labour share in the recent period (see Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), even though different explanations have been
put forward, ranging from the impact of globalization to the role of technical change.
At the theoretical level, however, the emphasis has very often been on the profit share (α), since the profit rate, one
of its determinants, is a fundamental variable in growth models. To avoid difficult problems, the analysis has been often
confined to steady state situations, where past, present and future values are well defined (see Robinson, 1956).
Since one of the aims of the paper is to link income share to wealth, it is rather important to understand that in this
case “tertium non datur”, in other words along with wages and profit, also rents must be considered, above all in a
period when different property bubbles have taken place. In this case, profit share becomes a subset of what may be
named the property share.
To better illustrate this aspect, positional goods are introduced into the analysis (see Ferri, 2016 for a generalization).
In other words, consider land for building that is exogenously given and that remains constant with respect to GDP.
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all this ratio θ1.1 Furthermore, suppose that it does not interfere with the production of other goods. Finally, suppose
hat rent (Rt) can increase because rich people invest their savings, especially when monetary policy is permissive.
In terms of the national accounts, the following identity holds:
Zt =  Yt +  Rt (3.1)
here all the items are in real terms, while Zt is GDP including rents.
By dividing through by GDP net of rents, i.e. Yt, one obtains:
zt =  1 + Rt
Yt
(3.2)
Assume that the ratio in the r.h.s. is constant and equal to θ2 so that the following relationship is obtained:
z0 =  1 +  θ2 (3.2′)
here the zero subscript refer to steady state values. Two implications follow. The first is that only one rate of growth
s relevant (gt). The second is that the relative price Qt (i.e. the value of rents deflated by the general level of prices)
emains to be determined. For instance, one can suppose the following specification:
Qt =  χ1 −  χ2 [(Rt −  πt) −  r0] + χ3(βt−1 −  β0) (3.3)
here Rt and πt are respectively the nominal rate of interest and the inflation rate and r0 is the steady state real rate
f interest, which in equilibrium also equal the rate of profit. Specification (3.3) then implies that the relative price of
ositional goods decreases when the monetary policy is tight (i.e. when the actual real rate of interest is bigger than its
teady state value) and increases with the wealth ratio.
.2.  The  three  components  of  income  share
In this context, property share (α) is equal to the sum of profit share (rtvt), where rt is the rate of profit multiplied
he capital/output ratio vt, and the rent share.2 Since the former is expressed in terms of Zt, while its determinants are
alued in terms of Yt, the corrective term z0 must be introduced:
αt = rtvt +  θ2
z0
(3.4)
This equation can be expressed as determining the rate of profit (r):
rt = αtz0 −  θ2
vt
(3.5)
here the negative role of rents on the rate of profit emerges, for a given α (to be determined later on).
The wealth ratio can be written in the following way:
βt =  vt +  Ωt (3.6)
here vt is the capital/output ratio, while Ωt is the property wealth ratio given by
Ωt =  Qtθ1 (3.7)
here θ1 is an increase in the property ratio can make personal wealth grow without necessarily impacting on capital,
hich remains a distinct concept.
1 For a justification of this assumption, see Stiglitz (2015).
2 One might consider also r interest on public debt. See Ferri (2016). According to Lawrence (2015) capital share is bigger than profit share.
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4.  Capital  ratios  and  technology
In the old growth theory, capital is essentially fixed depreciable capital (see Knibbe, 2014) or reproducible capital,
as stressed by Homburg (2014).3 Given the following accumulation equation (and ignoring depreciation):
Kt =  Kt−1 +  It−1
where K  is capital and I  investment, one can divide both sides by Yt in order to obtain the following capital/output ratio
equation:
vt = Kt
Yt
= vt−1(1 +  gt) +
it−1
(1 +  gt)
In a medium-run perspective, it is not reasonable to assume that the capital/output ratio is constant.4 This hypothesis
implies that the production function is assumed to have fixed coefficients, while technical progress can be assumed to
be Harrod-neutral.
Within this perspective, which is rather different from that advanced by Stiglitz (2015), three aspects are to be
stressed. The first is that one obtains the following determinants of the rate of growth:
gt = it−1
v∗
(4.1)
In the second place, this rate of growth is supposed to be lower than the “natural one” so that spare resources are
available and this justifies the absence of an explicit price-wage mechanism. Finally, it must be matched by aggregate
demand so that an interdependent process between aggregate demand and supply is set in motion.
5.  A nonlinear  demand-led  growth  model
The above nonlinear equations, expressed in intensive form, i.e. divided by Yt, can be inserted into a growth model
that presents three characteristics. First, differently from Piketty (2014) and Stiglitz (2015) investment plays a strategic
role. Second, the model also considers inflation and the monetary sector plays a role along with economic policies
measures. Third, steady state considerations are supplemented by a dynamic process of interdependence where the
feedbacks between variables make the co-movements between them more complex.
In order to close the model the following equations are be considered. The inflation rate is represented by a Phillips
curve, where the Okun’s law has been used to transform the rate of unemployment into a rate of growth of output:
πt =  π∗ +  φ1(πt−1 −  π0) +  φ2(gt −  g0) (5.1)
where π* is the target rate of inflation, and the subscript 0 again refers to the steady state value. The nominal rate of
interest (R) is determined according to a (simplified) Taylor equation of the type:
Rt =  R∗ +  ψ1(πt −  π0) (5.2)
where R* is the target interest rate. (Later on it will be modified.) The expected (real) rate of profit (r) is formulated in
the following simple adaptive way:
Etrt =  (1 −  ρ1)rt−1 +  ρ1r0 (5.3)
Given the values of these variables, the investment ratio can be determined in the following way:
it =  ia +  γ1 {Ert −  [(Rt −  πt)]} (5.4)
where ia is the autonomous component, while the term inside the square parenthesis represents the excess of the
expected rate of profit over the real rate of interest. Also for this equation a different specification will be introduced.
3 As is well known, in the “new growth” theories, human capital is considered. See Aghion and Howitt (1998).
4 According to Jones (2015), this ratio (referred to reproducible capital) has remained almost constant in the US during the post war period.
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The saving ratio is defined as:
st =  [(sπ −  sw)αt +  sw]z0 −  cββt
here sπ is the propensity to save out of profits, while sw represents the propensity to save out of wages. The usual
nequality holds:
sπ >  sw
On the contrary, cβ stands for the propensity to consume out of wealth (a mix of Pasinetti, 1962; Kaldor, 1956
ypothesis) and represents the channel through which wealth and inequality feedback on the system. Finally, z0
epresents the steady state ratio between GDP with rent.
The macro equilibrium implies that st = it and this implies that the property share is endogenously given by:
αt = it +  cββt −  swz0(sπ −  s)z0w (5.5)
In the above nonlinear system there are 10 unknowns gt, βt, Ωt, Qt, rt, πt, Rt, Ert, it and αt in 10 equations ((3.3),
3.5)–(3.7), (4.1) and (5.1)–(5.5)).5
.1.  Steady  state
The steady state values of the model (marked by the subscript 0) are easily obtained in a recursive way. In equilibrium,
he rate of profit is equal to the real rate of interest. It then follows that:
i0 =  ia (5.6)
nd therefore:
g0 = ia
v∗
(5.7)
It turns out, from (3.3), that:
Q0 =  χ1 (5.8)
This equation allows one to determine the wealth ratio, so that the steady state property share becomes (from (5.5)):
α0 = i0 +  cββ0 −  swz0(sπ −  sw)z0 (5.9)
The steady state values of the other variables are also easily obtained. In fact the rate of profit is given by Eq. (3.5):
r0 = α0z0 −  θ2t
v∗
(5.10)
Given the nominal rate of interest (R*) and the equality between the rate of profit and the real rate of interest, the
nflation rate is given by6:
π0 =  R∗ −  r0 (5.11)
.2.  A  disequilibrium  analysis
In order to detect the dynamics of the model and the co-variances between variables in a disequilibrium context
see Hicks, 1965), the nonlinear system of equations has been simulated. The values of the parameters are illustrated
n Table 1, while the dynamics are pictured in Fig. 1.The values of both, parameters and exogenous variables, are chosen by referring to empirical studies. In their
bsence, values capable of producing steady state close to the empirical values have been adopted.7
5 An alternative strategy would let vt change and assume a given income distribution.
6 The assumption of a constant θ2 constrains the steady state dynamics of Qt.
7 The steady state values of the main variables are the following: g0 = 0.0235, α0 = 0.2131, r0 = 0.0527, β0 = 2.8 and π0 = 0.0073.
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Table 1
Parameters and exogenous variables.
ϕ1 = 0.90; ϕ2 = 0.10; R0 = 0.06;
ψ1 = 1.6; v* = 2.55; ia = 0.06;
γ1 = 2.27; ρ1 = 0.2; θ1 = 0.25; θ2 = 0.10;
sπ = 0.80; sw = 0.16; cβ = 0.095 χ1 = 1; χ2 = 0.3; χ3 = 1.50.Fig. 1. The dynamics of the nonlinear system.
Starting from the steady state values and by introducing a temporary shock to the investment function, the model is
capable of generating persistent fluctuations, which are one of the main stylized facts characterizing these variables.
Fig. 1 illustrates the last 50 run of the simulation, where the period considered is 1500. The bounded dynamics are
fundamentally the result of two loops generating feedbacks of opposite sign: the classical positive feedback (centrifugal)
and the monetary negative (centripetal) feedback.
Investment plays a strategic role in both loops. In fact, it determines saving, and hence income distribution. Expan-
sions feed profits and further growth. However, expansions also feed inflation and make the nominal rate of interest
increase. The conflict between these two forces generates, for appropriate values of the parameters, a limit cycle that
captures the dynamics of the model.
Fig. 1 also allows us to make a comparison with Piketty’s results, even though the context is different. As in Piketty, the
dynamics of β  are negatively related to g. However, αt and βt are not positively related but they rather design a dynamical
loop. This weakens the possibility of inferring inequality by simply observing the dynamics of the functional distribution
of income. The macro inference hypothesis can be maintained only by considering the origin of wealth changes.
6.  The  robustness  of  the  model
The model is robust to parameters changes. In order to show some results, the linearized version of the model is
considered (see Appendix A).
The system can be formulated in a more compact way in matrix form as:
Axt =  Bxt−1
or
xt =  A−1Bxt−1
where all the variables included in vector x represent deviations from steady state values. Some eigenvalues of this
system are complex conjugate and have unitary modulus, |λ|  = 1, while the remaining are less than 1. Thus the fixed
point has properties similar to the Neimark bifurcation, with limit cycles being generated (see Kuznetsov, 2004).
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Table 2
Values of the parameters necessary to maintain |λ| = 1.
γ1 γ2
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1.27 1.5
1.3824 1.3824
The linearization is important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it allows us to test the robustness of the
odel: changes in the values of the parameters maintain the main structural properties of the system. On the other, it
dentifies the role of the different parameters.
For instance, one might wonder what happens if the propensity to consume out of wealth (cβ) increases. It is
orth noting that this is the only channel through which an increase in wealth can affect the dynamics of the system.
urthermore, the nature of this increase is such to allow a macro inference of inequality.
In the above linearized model, an increase in cβ makes the system unstable, because |λ|  becomes greater than 1. In
ther words, inequality can feed instability. The same holds true if one increases the values of χ2, χ3, θ1 and θ2. In
ther words, whenever the weight of rent increases, not only inequality rises but also the system can become unstable.
.1.  An  extension
It is worth stressing that the model is robust in a deeper sense. In fact, also changes in the specification of the
quations do not necessarily modify the qualitative properties of the model. Two cases are worth considering, the
nterest rate rule (IRR) and the investment equation.
Eq. (5.2) can be extended in the following way:
Rt =  R∗ +  ψ1(πt −  π0) +  ψ2(gt −  g0) (6.1)
The above equation extends Eq. (5.2) because it introduces the gap between actual growth and its steady state value
n the equation. Ceteris paribus, the role of the parameter ψ2 is stabilizing (in other words it diminishes the value of |λ|
hat becomes smaller than 1). This circumstance, however, does not allow one to conclude that the generalized Taylor
ule can check instability.
To this purpose, it is important to consider the possibility of deflation and the role of the following inequality:
Rt ≥  0 (6.2)
In case of both deflation and stagnation, the second and the third terms in the r.h.s. of (6.1) can become negative. It
ollows that inequality (6.2) creates a trade-off between the values of the parameters ψ1 and ψ2. This means that the
alue of ψ2 cannot be simply added to the value of ψ1, as it appears from Table 1. Furthermore, the trade-off is worse
he higher the value of γ1. It follows that the presence of inequality (6.2) is an obstacle to the countercyclical power of
onetary policy, as is well known in the literature.8
In addition to the extension of the Taylor equation, consider the following specification for the investment function:
it =  ia +  γ1 {Ert −  [(Rt −  πt)] +  γ2(gt −  g0)} (6.3)
In other words, an accelerator has been appended to the classical specification of the investment function. Also in this
ase, the value of γ2 is in a dynamic conflict with that of γ1, even though for different reasons. In fact, as appears from
able 2, the values of the two parameters necessary to maintain |λ|  = 1 stand in a negative relationship (see Appendix B).
Table 2 confirms that the classical hypothesis alone is enough to generate a limit cycle, while the opposite is not true
at least in this model). Furthermore, the value of the accelerator can become >1 if γ1 is allowed to decrease. Finally,
he two parameters can have equal values.
The presence of the accelerator parameter stresses the role that quantity adjustment plays in the model. They
einforce those based upon the changes in the profit margins that allow income distribution to endogenously adjust to
he investment dynamics.
8 One could also include the price of assets. Also in this case, the same considerations would hold. It is important to stress that Eq. (3.3) states
hat Qt is a function of monetary policy.
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Table 3
The impact of changes in i0.
i0 g0 |λ| max gt min gt
Benchmark 0.06 0.0235 1 0.030 −0.030
Stagnation 0.03 0.0118 1 0.045 −0.045
Sustained 0.09 0.0350 1 0.035 −0.035
6.2.  Implications  for  growth
At this stage of the analysis, suppose that i0, i.e. the exogenous value of investment, measured by the so-called
autonomous component, is changed. Two things happen. First of all, the value of |λ|  does not change. In other words,
the dynamic profile is maintained. However, the amplitude of the oscillations is modified in a considerable way, as
appears from Table 3.
It is important to stress that a higher i0 increases the steady state growth of the system without altering its dynamic
profile. Furthermore, it increases the amplitude of the fluctuations only marginally. In fact, the relationship between
growth and variability is strongly non linear and therefore asymmetric. A reduction in steady state growth is also
accompanied by a greater variability.
Two aspects are worth considering. The first is that episode such as the “Great Contraction” can have a durable
negative impact on growth because the higher variability has implied a greater degree of uncertainty that can affect
the state of the long-run expectations governing autonomous investment. There is therefore a potential link between
fluctuations and growth (as also stressed by Minsky, 1982).
The second aspect is that autonomous investment may also include public investment. In this case, the model should
be extended in order to take the fiscal variables into account. However, one can say that it could link medium-run
fluctuations to long-run growth, where the role of technology and institutions become strategic (see Ferri and Minsky,
1992).
7.  Concluding  remarks
The paper has analyzed the relationship between income shares, wealth and growth in an environment where
positional goods are taken into account and rent is generated. Even though this is not the most important empirical
channel through which capital gains have been generated during the recent bubble experience, its analytical role is
relevant. First, the presence of positional goods implies a clear-cut distinction between capital and personal wealth. In
the second place, it creates a gap between profit share and property share due to the existence of rent. Thirdly, it is a
macro engine of inequality, which is fed, inter alia, by instability. Finally, it allows one to consider the feedback from
inequality to inequality.
The relationships between these aspects have been examined within a demand-led model where investment plays
a strategic role. Furthermore, the model refers to a monetary economy where rates of profits and nominal rates of
interest (corrected by inflation) face each other in determining investment. Finally, the model is studied in a medium-
run perspective where actual dynamics vis-à-vis steady state relationships are taken into account in order to study the
co-movements between the variables.
The model generates persistent and bounded dynamics, where the stylized facts characterizing the present state of
the economy can be considered just a phase of these fluctuations. Within this perspective, changes in the wealth ratio
(β) are not accompanied by changes in capital ratio, v, which is assumed to be fixed. Furthermore, α, the property
share, and β, the wealth-output ratio, can be either positively or negatively related. Their links do not depend only on
the hypotheses underlying the model but also on the values of the parameters chosen and the monetary policy pursued.
Yet, the macro inference of inequality from the study of wealth dynamics still holds.
The model can be extended in several ways. A first line would be to allow rent to affect production as happens
in the classical authors. In order to accomplish this target, at least a two sector model must be considered. In the
second place, the role of monetary and financial aspects could be enriched. The introduction of a cash flow in the
investment function, along with the possibility of speculative debt according to a Minskian approach can be pursued
(see Ferri, 2016). Thirdly, the impact of these variables on inequality should be deepened, for instance by considering
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eterogeneity between families holding wealth. Finally, the labour market variables should be explicitly taken into
onsideration.
These enrichments can also allow to pursue more ambitious aims such as to better investigate how the medium-run
ynamics can influence the long-run rate of growth. In fact, inequality not only can impact on fluctuations but it may
lso interfere with growth through the role of institutions and technical change that become essential players (see
ristini et al., 2015).
.  The  linearized  model
In order to linearize the model, only the following Eqs. (5.5) and (3.5) are to be modified:
αt = it(sπ −  sw)z0 +
cβ
(sπ −  sw)z0 βt
rt = z0
v∗
αt
The system can be cast into the following matrix form, keeping in mind that all the variables are deviations from
heir respective steady state and that the following expressions have been used:
A1 = 1(spr −  sw)z0 ; A2 =
cβ
(spr −  sw)z0 ; R1 =
z0
v∗
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−ϕ2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ψ1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −χ2 χ2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 −γ  γ1 −γ1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −θ1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −A1 0 −A2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −R1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
gt
πt
Rt
Ert
Qt
it
Ωt
βt
αt
rt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
0 0 0 0 0
1
v∗
0 0 0 0
0 φ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ρ1)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 χ3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
gt−1
πt−1
Rt−1
Ert−1
Qt−1
it−1
Ωt−1
βt−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎝0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎠⎜⎝ αt−1
rt−1
⎟⎠
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In a more compact way, the system becomes:
xt =  Dxt−1
where D  is the matrix obtained by pre-multiplying the matrix in the r.h.s. by the inverse of the matrix in the l.h.s.
Using the same parameters indicated in Table 1, one obtains that the modulus of the maximum value of the couple
of complex roots (|λ|) = 1.
Furthermore, as one chooses γ1 as a bifurcation parameter, the derivative of the roots with respect to this parameters
are not null and in general the condition set by the Hopf (Neimark-Sacker) theorem are respected so that limit cycles
are generated. However, to study the attractiveness of the limit cycles higher order terms must be introduced (see
Kuznetsov, 2004).
B.  Linearizing  the  extended  model
In this case one has to introduce the two supplementary parameters ψ2 and γ2. For instance, if ψ2 = 0.2, then
γ1 = γ2 = 1.3824 can generate a cycle, given the other values of the parameters shown in Table 1. Other combinations
are possible as shown in Table 2.
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